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Larson: Defamation at the Workplace Employers Beware

DEFAMATION AT THE WORKPLACE
EMPLOYERS BEWARE
Richard J. Larson*
While the slow erosion of the "employment at-will" doctrine
has received considerable attention during the last several years,1 a
more subtle liberalization of employee protection has correspondingly evolved in defamation law. Employees who have been terminated, disciplined, investigated, given unfavorable references, or simply subjected to negative managerial evaluations, have increasingly
responded with lawsuits alleging that their employer's conduct constituted actionable defamation. 2 Such lawsuits have become particularly popular in jurisdictions which have resisted abrogation of the
"employment at-will" doctrine and where defamation, along with
claims for emotional distress or invasion of privacy, are increasingly
advanced as substitutes for wrongful discharge actions.
This proliferation in employee defamation suits has resulted in a
number of progressive judicial interpretations of the traditional state
common law rules of libel and slander. The present article will examine these new trends in employee defamation laws, highlight a
number of the most recent decisions applying the law of defamation
in the workplace, and review some of the defensive strategies employers are enlisting to combat employee defamation claims.
I.

COMMON LAW DEFAMATION

Historically, the common law tort of defamation was governed
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1. See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege 21
L. REV. 201 (1985); Abbasi, Hollman, Murray, Employment at Will: An Eroding Concept in Employment Relationships, 38 LAB. L. J. 21 (1987); Casenote, Morgan Drive Away,
Inc. v. Brant: Indiana Topples a Milestone in the Law of Retaliatory Discharge, 20 IND. L.
IDAHO

REV.

559 (1987). See also Comment, Speak No Evil: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts

Self-PublicationDefamation" Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,
71 MINN. L. REv. 1092 (1987).
2. See Middleton, Employers Face Upsurge in Suits Over Defamation, Nat'l L.J., May
4, 1987, at I col. 3; R. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION (1986); Bladgett, New Twist to
Defamation Suits, A.B.A.J. May, 1987 at 17.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1988

1

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal
[Vol. 5:1

by state law and typically was defined as a communication which
tended to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the esteem of the community or deter third persons from associating or

dealing with him. A publisher of defamatory statements was held
strictly liable for the consequences of his publication. 4 Written defamation, or libel, was considered actionable per se if its meaning was
clearly defamatory without resort to extrinsic evidence.' Slander, or
spoken defamation, was actionable per se only if it imputed commission of a crime, possession of a loathsome disease, or incompetence
in plaintiffs trade or profession.6
Language which was defamatory per se gave rise to a presumption that the statements were published with malicious intent, and
the plaintiff was excused from having to plead or prove special (pecuniary) damages.7 Defamatory communications by an employer regarding an employee were usually considered defamatory per se
since they typically reflected upon the employee's occupational
competency. 8

II.

CHANGING THE COMMON LAW: PUBLICATION

A.

Self-Compelled Publication

A fundamental element of a defamation cause of action was the
requirement that the defamatory communication had to be published
to someone other than the plaintiff.9 Since the interest sought to be
3. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 559 (1938); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, THE LAW OF
§ 11, at 773 (5th ed. 1984). See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D LIBEL AND SLANDER §§ I3 (1970).
4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 580 (1938). Specifically section 580 provides:
Except as stated in § 581, one who publishes defamatory matter of another is not
relieved from liability because
(a) he did not intend the matter so published to be understood as defamatory
and neither knew nor by the exercise of every possible precaution could
have known that it could be so understood, or
(b) knowing the matter to be defamatory, he did not intend to harm the
other's reputation.
5. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 569 (1938).
6. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 570-74 (1938).
7. Restatement, supra note 4.
8. 50 AM. JUR. 2D LIBEL AND SLANDER § 114 (1970); see also Pittman v. Larson Distributing Co., 724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (employer stated to a customer that the
employee had been fired because "he spent too much time in the office and on the telephone"
id. at 1382, rather than calling on customers. The court held the statement was defamatory
per se). In Pittman, the court held that the elements of a cause of action for slander per se are:
(I) an oral statement, (2) published to a third party, (3) which is defamatory of the plaintiff's
trade, business, or profession, and (4) requires no extrinsic evidence to show how it might be
taken as concerning the plaintiff or defaming him in his trade or business. Id. at 1387.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment b (1977).
TORTS,
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protected was a reputational one, no damage could occur without the

defendant communicating the statement to a third person. In the
employment context, however, a number of jurisdictions10 have recently relaxed the traditional publication requirement and permitted
employee defamation claims although: (1) the employer communicated the defamatory remark solely to the employee; or (2) the communication was made only between agents of the same corporate

employer.
Regardless of whether he has a duty to do so, an employer who
is discharging an employee will frequently give the employee an explanation for the termination. If this communication was conveyed
solely to the employee, the employer would not ordinarily be liable
because there was no publication to a third party. Nonetheless, at
least eight states have recognized a doctrine of "compelled self-publication" which permits employees to meet the publication requirement for defamation if the employee is in some way compelled to
repeat an employer's defamatory remarks to a third person, and if it
was foreseeable to the employer that the employee would be so
compelled."

To date, this doctrine has been applied only to employment situations where an employee was discharged and is thereafter compelled to republish his former employer's defamation when explaining his termination to a prospective employer.' 2 The inherent
10. See Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982); Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 73
Ga. 816, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389
(1969); Bretz v. Mayer, I Ohio Misc. 59, 203 N.E.2d 665 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1963); Poison v.
Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Kan. 1986); McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App.
3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389
N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694
S.W.2d 822 (Mo. App. 1985); Herberholt v. DePaul Community Health Center, 625 S.W.2d
617 (Mo. 1981); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980). But see Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 725 P.2d 38, (Colo. App. 1986) (court held
that when an employee repeats the employers allegedly defamatory statement to a prospective
employer no actionable publication has occurred. The court perceived no reason "for carving
out an exception to the general rule based on foreseeability in employment termination cases."
Id. at 41). See also infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
11. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn.
1986). When prospective employers inquired why the plaintiffs had left their previous employment, they responded by saying they had been terminated for gross insubordination. The company never directly communicated the statements to the prospective employers.
The Minnesota Court held that "in an action for defamation, the publication requirement
may be satisfied where the plaintiff was compelled to publish a defamatory statement to a
third person if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff would be so compelled.
Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
12. See Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 816, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946) (under a War
Manpowers Commission regulation a person seeking employment had to present a certificate
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compulsion for a job applicant to supply a truthful republication of
the reason for his prior discharge is generally an expected and foreseeable consequence of employment termination.' 3 Therefore the former employer is held liable because of the direct and foreseeable link
between his actions and the resulting injury to his former
employee. 4
Undoubtedly, the doctrine of compelled self-publication is a
boon to employees seeking redress for employment termination; however, commentators, justices, and at least one state legislature have
voiced objections to the adoption of this doctrine. 15 Characterizing
the device as a thinly-disguised and ill-founded substitute for the tort
of wrongful discharge, these critics observe that the doctrine is not
being used to protect reputations but is being misused in an attempt
to protect employees from termination for improper or maliciously

motivated reasons."6
For instance, after the Minnesota's Supreme Court's decision to
recognize the doctrine, 1 7 the state legislature enacted legislation
which curtailed employers liability for defamatory statements communicated through a former employee.' The law allows an emof availability to prospective employers. The court held the employer had defamed the employee when he wrote the reason for discharge on the employee's certificate and the employee
showed it to a prospective employer.); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d
389 (1969) (An employee was given false and defamatory reasons for her discharge. The court
held that it was foreseeable by the employer that in the ordinary course of events the employee
would repeat the statements to a third party. When the employer repeated the reason for her
discharge to a prospective employer a publication had been made); McKinney v. County of
Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
13. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888. [1] "The office manager admitted that it was foreseeable
that plaintiffs would be asked by prospective employers to identify the reason that they were
discharged. Their only choice would be to tell them 'gross insubordination' or to lie.
Fabrication, however, is an unacceptable alternative." Id.
14. Id. See also McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1980).
15. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1092; Tanick, Libel Comes to Work in Minnesota
BENCH & BAR OF MINN., July 1987 at 14; Churchey Adolph Coors Co., 725 P.2d 38, 40
(Colo. App. 1986); Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 884-85 (Forsberg, J. dissenting), modified, 389
N.W.2d 876; MINN. STAT. § 181-931 (1987).
16. Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 884-85.
17. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
18. MINN. STAT. § 181.933 (1987). The statute provides:
Notice of Termination
Subdivision 1. Notice required. An employee who has been involuntarily terminated may, within five working days following such termination, request in writing
that the employer inform the employee of the reason for the termination. Within
five working days following receipt of such request, an employer shall inform the
terminated employee in writing of the truthful reason for the termination.
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ployee to demand from his employer a written explanation for his
discharge,19 and the employer must comply with a "truthful reason
for the termination." 0 An employee cannot thereafter use the written explanation as a basis for a defamation claim against the
employer. 1
The statute's effect does not completely abolish the compelled
self-publication doctrine. A false reason for the employees discharge
could result in liability. In addition, the statute does not protect the
employer for oral or additional communications which the employee
may be compelled to repeat to a prospective employer.
Further criticism of the compelled self-publication rule focuses
on the poorly defined language being employed by the courts to describe the appropriate circumstances for application of the doctrine.
For instance, one court has cautioned that the exception should be
limited to situations where the plaintiff is "in some way compelled"
to repeat the defamatory communications, and such compulsion
"was, or should have been foreseeable" 22 to the defendant. Moreover, the employee must "take all reasonable steps to attempt to explain the true nature of the situation and to contradict the defamatory statement".23
In comparison, the other courts have held the doctrine applicable where the employer "has reason to believe the person defamed
will be under a strong compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory statement .. ."

Not only may such vague language

make judicial application difficult, but the inherent unpredictability
may further discourage already cautious employers from providing
honest reasons to an employee regarding his discharge.
B. Intra-CorporateCommunications
Another liberalization of the publication requirement in employee defamation claims has occurred through judicial abrogation
of the common law rule that intra-corporate communications were
Subd. 2. Defamation action prohibited. No communication of the statement
furnished by the employer to the employee under subdivision 1 may be made the

subject of any action for libel, slander, or defamation by the employee against the
employer. Laws 1987, c. 76, § 3.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
Id.

24.

McKinney v. County of Santa Clara 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89,

93-94 (1980).
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not considered publications to third parties. The origins for the common law approach are located in an early series of cases involving
dictations between corporate managers and their employee stenographers. 25 The courts reasoned that since the originator of the statements had a corporate duty to write letters, and the stenographer's
duty was to reduce the communications to shorthand and then
recopy it, the communication was simply part of the same act, that
of producing the letter.26 Consequently, the stenographer would not
be considered a third person for purposes of defamatory publication.
This "single corporate act" theory was later broadened to encompass not only intra-corporate dictations, but any communication
between employees of the same corporation.2 7 Thus, a defamed employee who sued the corporation, usually under tort principles of respondeat superior,was likely to have his claim summarily dismissed
for lack of legal "publication".
In essence, the courts had expressed a rule that when agents of
the same corporation communicate information in the performance
of their appropriate job functions, they are not regarded as separate
persons. They are "part and parcel of the corporation itself"'28 and
their communications constituted merely the communications of the
corporation to itself. The practical effect of this rule was to absolutely immunize the corporate defendant as to intra-corporate
communications.
Although some jurisdictions continue to follow the traditional
25. See Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 32 A.D. 465, 53 N.Y.S. 1033 (1898) (the general manager of the company dictated an alleged libelous letter to a secretary employed by the
company as a stenographer and typewriter. The letter was in reference to the business of the

company. The court held there was not the requisite publication for a libel cause of action.);
Cartwright v. Fischel, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278 (1917) (The court held "that dictation of a

letter to a stenographer, when employed by the person or corporation, is not sufficient publication, in the absence of any repetition by the person or stenographer to other persons." Id. at
279). Freeman v. Dayton, 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S.W.2d 255 (1929) (The court held that dictation of a letter containing libelous matter to a stenographer does not constitute publication in
the sense of the law of libel).

26. Owen, 32 A.D. at 467, 53 N.Y.S. at 1034.
27.

See Prins v. Holland North-America Mortgage Co., 107 Wash. 206, 181 P. 680

(1919) (the court held that there is no publication of the libel when one agent of a corporation
communicates the libel to another agent of the corporation); Biggs v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 66 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1933) (a manager of the railroad made libelous statements about
an employee. These statements were communicated to other members of the corporation in the
ordinary course of business. As a result, the employee was discharged and not reinstated. The
court held there was no publication when the communication was between agents of the corporation); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Davidson, 194 Okla. 115, 148 P.2d 468 (1944) (there was

no actionable publication when a supervisor spoke allegedly libelous words to an employee in
the presence and hearing of a fellow employee).
28. Prins, 181 P. 2d at 680.
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"no-publication" rule for intra-corporate communications," an increasing number of states have recently abandoned the rule and now

recognize legal publication for such communications." In rejecting
the logic of the common law rule, courts have referred to the basic

fact that while a corporation is a single artificial entity for many
legal purposes, corporate status should not afford the entity any

added immunity for its torts. 1 Corporate employees are individuals
with reputational interests equal to those of non-corporate employees
and the former should not receive any less benefit from the defamation laws. 2
The states which have abolished the common law nonpublication rule generally do acknowledge that many intra-corporate communications will still be immune because of the employer's qualified
privilege33 to communicate work related information within the corporation.3 4 Nonetheless, removal of the no publication barrier to employee defamation claims could significantly improve an employee's
posture during settlement negotiations and trial. Pretrial motions for
dismissal, based upon the employees inability to plead legal publica29. See Ellis v. Jewish Hosp., 581 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Jones v.
Golden Spike Corp., 97 Nev. 24, 623 P.2d 970 (1981); Satterfield v. McLellan Stores Co., 215
N.C. 582, 2 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1939); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Vance, 165 Va. 363, 182
S.E. 264, 270-71 (1935); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Melikyan, 424 So.2d 1114 (La. App.
1982); K-Mart Corp. Inc. v. Pendergrass, 494 So.2d 600 (Ala. 1986).
30. See Franklin v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, (Minn. 1986); Luttrell v.
United Telephone System, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d, 620, 683 P.2d 1292 (1984), aff'd, 236 Kan.
710, 695 P.2d 1279 (1985); Jones v. Britt Airways, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 389 (D.C. Il. 1984);
Brewer v. American Nat'l. Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1980); Pirre v. Printing Developments Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979); Kelly v.
General Telephone Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 186 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1982); Brantley v. Zantop
Int'l Airlines Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Mich. 1985). These opinions "have held that while
communications between supervisory employees of a corporation concerning a third employee
may be qualifiedly privileged, they are still publication." Luttrell, 683 P.2d at 1294. See also
RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577, comments h and i, (1977); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 3, § 113 at 798-99; Note, Libel and Slander-IntracorporateCommunication as Publication to Third Persons-Luttrell v. United Telephone System, 33 U. KAN. L.
REV. 759 (1985); Annotation, Defamation" publication by intracorporatecommunication of
employee's evaluation, 47 A.L.R. 4th 674 (1986).
31. Luttrell, 9 Kan. App. 2d -, 683 P.2d at 1294. See Note, supra note 30 at 765-769.
32. Id. See Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N.E.2d 595 (1943);
Lux-Brill Productions v. Remco. Indus., 48 Misc. 2d 697, 265 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1965).
33. A communication is qualifiedly privileged if it is made in good faith on any subject
matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a
duty, if it is made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. Luttrell, 683 P.2d at
1294. See supra notes 57-88.
34. As a result of the qualified privilege, the employee has the burden of proving that
the defendants acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth before the
privileged can be overcome. Id.
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tion, will no longer be routinely granted and the corporate employer
faces the risk of triable issues concerning the existence and abuse of
its qualified privilege. The intensified uncertainty presented by this
scenario will make employee defamation claims increasingly threatening to corporate defendants.
C. Changing the Common Law: ConstitutionalPrivilege
At common law, strict liability was imposed upon a defendant
for the publication of a false and defamatory remark. The defendant
was liable despite his having used due care to determine the accuracy of his statements and his reasonable belief that the statements
were true.35 However, since 1964 the Supreme Court has insisted
that adequate protection of the First Amendment's guarantees of
free speech and free press mandated a modification in the common
law rule of strict liability." Liability can no longer be imposed absent a showing that the defendant was at fault to some degree in
ascertaining the truth or falsity of his remarks. 7
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8 the high court ruled that
in a case involving a public official and a media defendant, the plaintiff could recover only where the defendant evidenced "actual malice," or reckless disregard of the truth, in determining the accuracy
of its remarks.3 9 Thereafter, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,4° the
Court balanced a private individual's reputational interests against a
media defendant's First Amendment privileges, and concluded that
the actual malice standard of New York Times was not a prerequisite for liability.41 Instead, a state could permit the plaintiff to re35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 592A special note (1977).
36.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

37. See Id.; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, U.S. _
106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Mr. Sullivan, an elected official of Montgomery, Alabama,

brought a libel suit against the New York Times Company (publisher of the New York Times
newspaper) and others for a defamatory advertisement published against him in the
newspaper.

39. Id. at 256. The Sullivan fault requirement was extended to cases involving public
"figures" in Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
40.
41.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id. at 346-48. The Court reasoned that this approach "recognizes the strength of the

legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation,
yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation." Id.
at 348.
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cover upon a lesser standard of fault, as long as strict liability was
not imposed. Nonetheless, the private plaintiff would be compelled to
establish actual malice before presumed or punitive damages could
be awarded.42
In the two decades following Gertz, the Supreme Court addressed a variety of defamation cases in which the characterization
of the plaintiff as a public or private figure (and arguably the defendant's media or non-media status) appeared to be the predominant consideration in determining the appropriate fault standard for
liability.43 However, during the last few years, several decisions of
the Court have interjected new considerations into the liability
formula for defamation and confused the prior First Amendment
analysis.44
In Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc.,45 the
Court addressed a libel claim brought by a private figure plaintiff
against a non-media defendant and involving speech which the Court
characterized as a "matter of private concern." 46 The issue presented
was whether the state court erred in holding that a private figure
plaintiff could recover punitive damages if only negligence, rather
than the "actual malice" required in Gertz, were shown. The Supreme Court affirmed the state tribunal's decision, and held that the
negligence standard was permissible under these particular facts.47
Justice Powell, reconciled the apparent inconsistency with Gertz by
noting that the defamatory statements in Dun, unlike those in Gertz,
did not involve any "matters of public concern" and consequently,
the First Amendment interests of the publisher were of lesser
significance.48
42. Id. at 348-50. The Court requires that state remedies for defamatory falsehoods
reach "no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved." Id. at 349.
(wrongful injury to reputation.) Where a defamation plaintiff does not prove knowledge of

falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, compensation must be limited to actual injury. Actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss but can include impairment of reputation and

standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish. Id. at 350.
43. See Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).

44. See Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Philadelphia Newspaper Inc. v. Hepps, U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
45. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
46. Id. at 751-52. In Dun, a private individual sued Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. for a defam-

atory credit report it sent to potential creditors.
47. Id.
48. Id. Justice Powell reasoned that the false credit report was a matter of private concern and not of public interest. Since it is speech on matters of public concern that lie at the
heart of First Amendment protections, speech concerning a private matter should not be afforded any special protection.
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The Court in Dun apparently discounted the relevancy of the
defendant's non-media status and shifted its focus instead to the
public or private content of the defamatory speech. 49 After Dun, the
eligibility of a private figure plaintiff for recovering punitive or presumed damages, without having to establish the defendant's actual
malice, depends upon a characterization of the speech's content as a
"matter of private concern."50 Unfortunately, this analytic departure
from earlier First Amendment treatment in defamation cases generated considerable speculation regarding the opinion's possible
broader implications, 1 and these uncertainties were exacerbated by
Justice Powell added that, in speech involving matters of private affairs, "[t]here is no
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with
meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability
causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press. . . . [i]n light of the reduced constitutional
value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing of "actual
malice." Id. at 760-61.
49. The Court's focus upon the characterization of the speech as "public" or "private"
had been previously employed in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). However, in
Gertz, the Court seemed to have rejected such a characterization as a pertinent consideration,
and it was not until the Dun decision that the private or public nature of the speech was again
cited by the Court as a decisive factor. See LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An
Accommodation of the Competing Interests in a ConstitutionalFramework, 66 NEB. L. REV.
249, 267 (1987); Smolla, supra note 2 at 66; Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1952 (1986).
50. The Dun opinion gave little insight as to the appropriate test for distinguishing between speech on matters of public concern and speech on matters of private concern. However,
Justice Powell's decision does give cursory mention to Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 29 and Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 1983, thus suggesting that the analysis of those cases has been
resurrected for future First Amendment application. For further discussion of this topic, see
Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., PhiladelphiaNewspapers v. Hepps,
and Speech on Matters of Public Concern: New Directions in First Amendment Defamation
Law, 20 IND. L. REV. 767 (1987); Peters, Defamation and the First Amendment-Recent
Cases Emphasizing the Content of Defamatory Communications and the Nature of the Communication, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1089 (1986); Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A
New Role for an Old Doctrine in the ConstitutionalLaw of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. Rav.
241 (1987).
51. Dun made clear that in defamation claims brought by private plaintiffs and involving
speech on private concerns, the First Amendment does not require actual malice before a
finding for presumed or punative damages. However, the broad language of the opinion may
suggest further implications. Justice White, in his concurring opinion, observes that although
the plurality expressly mentions the inapplicability of Gertz only with respect to presumed or
punative damages, the language completely employed negates the Gertzfault requirement for
defamation liability in cases similar to Dun. In other words, Dun has been construed as altogether rejecting the Gertz rules, at least where the controversy involves a private-figure plaintiff defamed about private concerns. Theoretically, the states would therefore be free to return
to strict liability defamation in some cases. Obviously, such an interpretation of Dun would
lead to a significant adjustment in state defamation actions, including those brought by defamed employees. See Dun, 472 U.S. at 774 (White, J.concurring in the judgment); SMOLLA,
supra note 2 at 66; LeBel supra note 49, at 267; Peters, supra note 50, at 110- 1l;
Mutafis v.
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the Court's 1986 decision in PhiladelphiaNewspapers v. Hepps.52
In Hepps, the Court held that a private figure plaintiff bears the
burden of showing that speech involving a matter of public concern
is false before he can recover from a media defendant. 5 The Hepps
ruling reaffirmed the Dun opinion's focus on the content of the defamatory speech, but also reintroduced the defendant's media status
as a decisive consideration in its First Amendment analysis.54
The justices confusing and potentially divergent approaches in
Gertz, Dun and Hepps reveals the Court's ambiguous position as to
the appropriate fault standard in private figure defamation cases.
Since employee defamation cases will often involve private figure
plaintiffs who are defamed by non-media defendants through speech
which could be either a matter of private or public concern, the
Court's unsettled interpretations of the First Amendment have a direct and unavoidable effect on workplace defamation claims. Among
the most relevant uncertainties posed by the high court's recent decisions are: (1) what is the relevance of a defendant's non-media status
in deciding if a private figure plaintiff has the burden of proving the
defendant's remarks were untrue. Also, whether the Hepps' decisions
reference to the defendant's status implies another readjustment of
the appropriate fault standard for awarding punitive or presumed
damages to a private figure plaintiff; (2) whether an identifiable and
useful test exists for distinguishing speech involving matters of public versus private concern; 5 and (3) whether Dun may be interpreted
to not only have narrowed the Gertz holding regarding punitive and
presumed damages, but to have abolished the requirement of fault,
even for liability, in a private figure defamation case. 6
D. Changing the Common Law: Qualified Privilege
Well before the Supreme Court created constitutional protections for certain defamatory communications, the common law recognized that some publications which might ordinarily be actionable
should escape liability because the defendant was acting in furtherErie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985).
52.
53.

U.S. - 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
Id. at 1564. Hepps involved a principal stockholder of a corporation who sued the
-

Philadelphia Inquirer for a defamatory series of articles which suggested that the plaintiff was
affiliated with organized crime and had used his affiliation to secure preferential state govern-

ment treatment for the corporation.
54.

Id. at 1563-64. See Peters, supra note 49, at 1113-14.

55. See supra note 50.
56. See supra note 51.
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ance of a socially important interest. 57 If the interest was one of paramount importance, the defendant might be granted absolute immunity for his false statements, even at the expense of uncompensated
harm to the plaintiff's reputation.58 The defendant's particular purposes, motives, or the reasonableness of his remarks were unimportant if the statements were to be protected by an absolute privilege.

9

Absolute immunity was, and continues to be, restricted to a few
limited situations such as statements made during judicial and legislative proceedings, comments made by certain executive officers in
the lawful discharge of their duties, and remarks made pursuant to
the consent of the plaintiff.60 This privilege is rarely applicable to
defamatory statement's made by employers about their employees.61
If the societal interest which warranted the communication was
not substantial enough to enjoy an absolute privilege, the publication
might nonetheless be entitled to a conditional or qualified privilege. 2
The qualified privilege was uniformly extended to employers who
published statements in the ordinary course of their business. 3 The
most commonly expressed interests justifying the employer's protection under a qualified privilege were classified as: (1) A common interest shared between the employer and a third party. The privilege
existed as long as the interest concerned a legitimate business concern and the employer believed facts existed which a third party was
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-592A (1977); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 114 (4th ed. 1971).
58. Id.
59. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, at 815-24.
60. See Lewis v. Elliot 628 F. Supp. 512, 516 (D.D.C. 1986); Keys v. Chrysler Credit
Corp. 303 Md. 397, -,
494 A.2d 200, 203 (1985); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, reh'g
denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959).
61. For situations in which an absolute privilege has been accorded an employer's defamatory remarks about his employees, see Merritt v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 811 Mich. App.
279, 265 N.W.2d 124 (1978) (communication reason for employee's discharge to Union, pursuant to collective bargaining terms) DeLuca v. Reader, 227 Pa. Super 392, 323 A.2d 309
(1974); Surrency v. Harbison 489 So.2d 1097 (Ala. 1986); Hull v. Central Transport Inc. 628
F.Supp. 784 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (publication during arbitration proceedings involving employee
grievance). See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 451 (1977).
62. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, at 824, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 592A (1977); See generally Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified
Privilege to Publish Employee's Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R. 4th 144 (1983);
Garziano v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 818 F.2d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1987).
63. See Happy 40, Inc. v. Miller, 63 Md. App. 24, 491 A.2d 1210, 1216 and numerous
cases cited therein; Stuempges v. Parke, Davis, & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980)
(whether a particular occasion gives rise to the existence of a qualified privileged generally
considered to be a question of law for the court to decide). See Garziano, 818 F.2d at 385-86;
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986); R.
SLACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS (1980); see infra notes 67-75.
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entitled to know.6 4 This occasion for the qualified privilege is exemplified by communications among business partners and intra-corporate communications. 5 (2) The interest of a third party in receiving
relevant information about an employee.66 For instance, if an employee reference letter from a former employer was sent to a prospective employer and the information conveyed was reasonably calculated to protect the prospective employer's interests in hiring
honest and efficient servants, the communication was protected;67 (3)
The employers own business interests could also warrant a qualified
privilege, although not every alleged reason for a communication
would necessarily entitle an employer to defame an employee.6 8 A
common example of this is an employer's explanation to the work
force of the reasons for a particular employees being discharged or
disciplined. 69 The employer's interests justifying the publication are
the maintenance of general discipline and worker morale.70
Because the employer's privilege is usually not absolute, it can
be forfeited by "abuse". While there is no uniform definition of what
constitutes "abuse" of the qualified privilege, the most comprehensive common law definition provides that the privilege could be lost
by a publication for an improper purpose, publication in an improper
manner, or publication not based upon a reasonable belief in the
truth of the statements.7 1 Accordingly, communications to persons
64.

W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, at 826; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
§ 596 (1977); see Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 876.
65. Caruso v. Local Union, 107 Wash. 2d 524, 730 P.2d 1299, cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 67
(1987); (Wash. 1987); Tannenbaum v. Foerster, 648 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D: Wisc. 1986); Kelly
v. General Tel. Co. 136 Cal. App. 3d 287, 168 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1982); Lull v. Wick Constr.
Co., 614 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1980); Smith v. Greyhound Line Co., 614 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 595 (1977); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 3, at 826-27.
67. See Kellums v. Freight Sales Centers, Inc., 467 So.2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Happy 40, Inc. v. Miller, 63 Md. App. 24, 491 A.2d 1210 (1985); Haldeman v. Total
Petroleum Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1985); Lewis, 389 N.W. at 876. The interest of the
general public, e.g. law enforcement, has also been cited as justifying an employer's conditional privilege regarding, for instance, defamatory allegations of employee theft. See Heselton
v. Wilder, 496 A.2d 1063 (Mc. 1985); Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan 1, 722 P.2d 1106
TORTS

(1986).
68.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (1977).
69. See Garziano, 818 F.2d at 380; Lawson v. Howmet Alum. Corp., 449 N.E.2d 1172
(Ind. App. 1983). Communication to co-workers regarding the reasons for an employee's discharge have also been protected based on the employee's interests in avoiding similar
terminations.
70. Garziano, 818 F.2d at 380. See also Knight v. Baker, 173 Ind. App. 314, 363
N.E.2d 1048 (1977).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 250-68 (1977). In contrast to the determination of whether a qualified privilege exists in a particular situation, "abuse" of the privilege is
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not within the protected interest, publication of information unnecessary to accomplish the protected purpose, excessive or intemperate
language, an unreasonable belief in the existence of a protected interest, a publication motivated primarily out of ill will, spite, or hatred, or a publisher's negligent determination of the truth or falsity
of the communication were all potential forms of qualified privilege
72

"abuse.,

1

The common law rules regarding the employer's qualified privilege have necessarily been re-evaluated since the aforementioned
First Amendment rulings of the Supreme Court."3 Of particular relevance to the qualified privilege is the Court's suggestion in Gertz
that the common law rule of strict liability for defamation can no
longer be followed. 7 4 Instead, a defendant must be at least negligent
in ascertaining the truth of falsity of his remarks before liability will
attach.
Since the common law qualified privilege typically only immunized a publisher from negligence, application of the Gertz fault requirement in all defamation cases seemingly renders the qualified
privilege meaningless.7 5 One manner of avoiding this anomoly would
be to interpret Gertz as inapplicable to nonmedia defendants, such
as employers. However, the clear trend is to find that the constitutional implications of Gertz apply regardless of the defendant's status. 76 The states consequently have been left with the option of either
abolishing the qualified privilege, or of elevating the standard of
fault necessary to abuse the privilege. To date, no jurisdiction has
elected to eliminate the employer's qualified privilege,7 7 but the
states have disagreed as to the new level of fault which should be
required for "abuse" of the privilege. 8
a question of fact. See supra note 66.
72. Id. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, at 831-35; Annotation, supra
note 62; Sugarman v. RCA Corp., 639 F. Supp. 780, 787 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
73. See supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text.

74. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
75. R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 8-33; RESTATEMENT
cial note to topic 3 (1977).

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 592A spe-

76. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 780-85 (1985);
Culliton v. Mize, 403 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Bainhauer v. Manuokian 215

N.J. Super. 9, -., 520 A.2d 1154, 1167 (1987);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 580A,

comment h, (1977). See also Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985); Great
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846 (1985); Schiffrin, Defendant
Nonmedia Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 915 (1978).

77.

However, the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 592A (1977), suggests that this

option may be an eventual development of the basic Gertz principles.

78. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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One popular approach is a hybrid standard that triggers a forfeiture of the privilege upon a showing that an employer's communication was either7 9 actuated by "common law malice" or made with
"actual malice." Common law, or express, malice refers to a publisher's ill will, spite or hostility in making defamatory statements."
Actual malice is unrelated to the defendant's motivations for publishing his remarks, but is borrowed from the Supreme Court's First
Amendment decisions and focuses solely upon the defendant's degree
of care in determining the truth or falsity of his statements."'
Relatively few states have undertaken any thorough explanation
of this new "constitutionalized" standard for the qualified privilege,
but the standard apparently applies the "actual malice" fault requirement only in cases involving abuse through a defendant's faulty
ascertainment of the truth or falsity of his remarks. The "common
law malice" standard is limited to situations where the alleged abuse
arises from defendant's improper motives in communicating the defamatory statements. Unfortunately, the state courts are generally
confused over whether the other common law means of abusing the
privilege, i.e. excessive publication or unreasonable belief in the existence of a privilege, remain subject to a mere negligence standard, or
whether they must be re-evaluated after Gertz. For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts was modified after the Gertz ruling to
state that the privilege was forfeited if a defendant publishes a defamatory matter knowing it is false or in reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity.82 However, the Restatement retained the common
law forms of abuse such as excessive publication,83 publication of
defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the occasion is privileged,84 publication
based upon an unreasonable belief that a privilege existed and publication for improper purpose. 85 These other forms of abuse are apparently preserved under a negligence standard.88
79.

See Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 1986); Garziano v. E.I. Dupont de

Nemours Co., 818 F.2d 380, 389; Grostick v. Ellsworth, 158 Mich. App. 18, 404 N.W.2d 685
(1987); Annotation, supra note 62.

80. Haldeman, 376 N.W.2d at 103-104. Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245,
254 (1974).
81. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J. Dissenting); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977).

83.
84.
85.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 604 (1977).
§§ 605-605A (1977).
§ 603 (1977).

86. See supra notes 82-85; see also Schneider v. Pay 'N Save Corp., 723 P.2d 619, 625
(Alaska 1986); Robison v. Le Screnier, 721 F.2d 1101, 1109-10 (1983); but see Bratt v. In-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1988

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 5:1

Other states have opted for alternative interpretations of the effect of Gertz on the employer's qualified privilege. A number of
tribunals have elected to rely exclusively upon either common law
malice or actual malice in determining whether an abuse of the employer's privilege has occurred. These courts may or may not acknowledge loss of the privilege via excessive publication, for an improper purpose, or other common law basis.8"
Interestingly, several of the jurisdictions which have expressly
rejected common law malice as a form of abuse nonetheless suggest
that a defendant's ill will or spite is relevant evidence of actual malice.8 At least two jurisdictions continue to require only negligence in
the employer's determination of the falsity of his remarks, despite
the court's express recognition that Gertz may have negated the significance of such a "privilege." 89
Obviously, no judicial consensus exists on the correct standard
for abuse of the employer's qualified privilege after Gertz and its
progeny. The resulting ambiguity has encouraged employees to initiate legal actions for employer defamation, and has generated considerable anxiety for employers. Without clear guidelines regarding the
existence and limits of the common law qualified privilege, employers reliance upon their traditional conditional immunity poses significant risks. The following section will address in greater detail some
measures being taken by employers to reduce their potential liability
from employee defamation claims.
III. EMPLOYER DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES
In response to the current state of flux in judicial construction
of defamation claims arising at the workplace, many employers are
cautiously experimenting with various defense strategies to curtail
employee lawsuits. Foresighted labor law practitioners are providing
clients with suggested guidelines to follow when conveying information regarding employees. Although the objective of this article is not
tern. Bus. Mach. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 1984).
87. See Pittman v. Larson 724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. App. 1986) (actual malice only); Austin v. Torrington Co., 810 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 489 (1987)
(malice in fact); Haldeman v. Total Petroleum Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1985) (common
law malice only); Happy 40, Inc., 491 A.2d 1211 (actual malice only); Turner v. Halliburton,
722 P.2d 1106 (Kan. 1986) (common law malice only).
88. Katz v. Enzer, 504 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ohio App. 1985); Frank B. Hall & Co., v,
Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 620 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
89. See Krochalis v. Ins. Co. of N.Am., 629 F. Sup. 1360, 1366-67 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Chicarella v. Passant, 343 Pa. Super. 330, 494 A.2d 1109, 1113 (1985); See also Schneider v.
Pay 'NSave Corp, 723 P.2d 619, 625 (Alaska 1986).
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to extensively review these suggested procedures, a brief discussion
of some of the most popular defense strategies will highlight the seriousness of employers' concerns about employee defamation claims
and aid in illustrating the potential future problems which may face
the state courts.
Perhaps the most fashionable practice being adopted to rebut
defamation claims in employee termination cases is the policy of providing other employers with only "neutral" employee references.
Based on the simple theory that less information conveyed means
less chance for defamation liability, neutral references typically release only limited, undisputed facts such as employee job title, period
of employment, and wage scale. To avert claims that a neutral reference is impliedly defamatory, the practice is uniformly enforced for
all employees. Of course, all employees should also be informed, in
advance, of the company's neutral reference of policy. Neutral references have the advantage of being both a simple practice to institute
and nondiscriminatory.
However, widespread adoption of this policy among employers
will undoubtedly focus greater judicial attention on the practice's
drawbacks. For instance, if an employee is discharged for some particularly egregious reason, or if the employer has knowledge of some
serious impediment to the employee's safe performance of job tasks,
a court might consider the former employer's failure to disclose such
information a form of "negligent reference."" 0 Furthermore, neutral
references will penalize capable, diligent former employees who have
earned, and who need, a positive referral for a subsequent job. Finally, the practice defeats the continued usefulness of the employer's
traditional qualified privilege. Self-censorship by employers can only
hinder the societal interest in employment of the best qualified
employees.
Although numerous employers disdain the use of neutral employee references, many are willing to adopt the derivative approach
of attempting to couch their references in the form of opinions rather
than facts. This practice is premised on the widely-held belief that
statements of opinion cannot be defamatory. 91 However, far from
providing a "safe harbor" against liability, statements believed to be
mere opinion can often constitute "mixed opinions" or other actiona90.

A similar theory is currently exemplified in states where psychiatric professionals are

required to disclose to authorities information about patients who might harm other persons.
See G. PANARO. EMPLOYERS GUIDE TO REFERENCE CHECKS, 28-30 (1987).
91. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Belliveau v. Rerick, 504
A.2d 1360, 1362 (R.I. 1986).
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ble forms of defamation.
Various state courts, legal commentators, and the Restatement's
drafters have exhaustingly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to clearly
demarcate nonactionable opinions from actionable defamation. 2 For
instance, in a recent Colorado decision 93 the court used a "totality of
circumstances, 9 4 test to find that an employer had defamed his former employee. The employer had stated that the plaintiff "wasn't
doing a good job" and "spent too much time in the office and on the
telephone.19 5 The court's three part test required analysis of whether
the statements were "cautiously phrased in terms of apparency"; 6
examination of the statements in light of their context, not just the
objectionable words used; and consideration of all circumstances surrounding the publication, including the medium of communication
97
and the audience.
Other courts have embraced approaches which focus on the degree to which a statement is either "laden with factual contex" ' 98 or
"verifiable." 99 The Restatement litmus test turns on whether the alleged opinion implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory
facts. 10 For example, if A writes to B about neighbor C that "I
think he (C) must be an alcoholic," without a further explanation,
the statement may be actionable because it implies undisclosed defamatory facts about C.101 Only where the speaker expressly discloses the facts upon which his opinion is based is the statement considered "pure opinion" and nonactionable. Given the complexity and
variety of these numerous tests for defining what is nonactionable
opinion, an employer would seem ill-advised to attempt draftipg a
92. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
93. Pittman v. Larson, 724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. App. 1986).
94. Id. at 1387.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1388.
97. Id. See also Capan v. Daugherty, 402 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (four
factor test for ascertaining whether defamatory remarks are mere opinion: (1) the degree of
precision and specificity of the disputed comment; (2) the verifiability of the statement; (3) the
literary and social context of the remark; and (4) the public or political arena in which the
statement was made); Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1985) (liability found against employer, Diana Ross, for statements in a "To Whom It May Concern" letter, commenting on
her employees' unacceptable personal and work habits); Connolly v. Labowitz, 519 A.2d 138
(Del. 1986); See generally R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 615-637.
98. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 1980).
99. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977);
See generally R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 625-626.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); See also Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1982).

101.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 506 illustration 3 (1977).
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reference which could safely be considered nondefamatory, yet still
contain useful information.
Another approach for employers wishing to avoid defamation
lawsuits is to obtain the employee's consent to employer-employee
communications. Written and/or oral consent agreements are frequently prepared by prospective employers for all job applicants. The
effect of the agreements is to permit former employers to fully and
freely respond to the employer's inquiries. The advantage of this
practice is that the common law has long recognized that consent
creates an absolute privilege from defamation liability.102 In other
words, the publisher's motives, purposes, or belief in the truth of his
remarks is irrelevant because the privilege is unconditional. Further,
even if the particular jurisdiction refuses to recognize the absolute
privilege, the employees voluntary and knowing consent to the release to employment evaluations should aid in rebutting a charge of
employer "malice."
The disadvantages which attend the use of consent forms include the fact that such agreements are not routinely approved by all
courts. 10 3 Defenses founded upon duress or unconscionability may be
successfully raised. In addition, some courts as well as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 04 logically reason that consent forms generally provide only for the employee's consent to the dissemination of
truthful information regarding past employment. Rarely would such
agreements expressly ask for an employee's consent to be defamed.
Indeed, any such agreement would violate most states public policy
against the use of consent as a defense to an intentional tort. 05
A final recommendation frequently made to employers who wish
to reduce their potential liability for communicating employees' work
histories is to keep a detailed record of all correspondence and information pertaining to each employee. A sufficient "paper fortress"
will often deter an employee's successful prosecution of a defamation
action. Suggested record-keeping would include: employee's resume
102. Ernst v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 475 N.E.2d 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Dominguez v.
Babcock, 696 P.2d 338 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 727 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1986); Zuniga v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 100 N.M. 414, 671 P.2d 662 (1983); Royer v. Steinberg, 90 Cal. App.
3d 490, 153 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1979); Johnson v. City of Buckner, 610 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).
103. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS comment d (1977); Baker v. Lafayette College;
350 Pa. Super. 68, -, 504 A.2d 247, 267-73 (1986) (Spaeth, J. dissenting); Lee v. Paulsen,
273 Or.103,106, 539. P.2d 1079, 1080-81 (1975).
105. Cf. Kellums v. Freight Sales Centers Inc., 467 So.2d 816, 817-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
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and application form, customer correspondences, telephone memos
from communications with the employee's references, employee evaluations, copies of any court records or private investigatory reports,
and any disciplinary records.
In an employee discharge case, it is often recommended that the
employer review the relevant records with the employee and communicate a reason for the termination. Unexplained or unsupported discharges may provoke employees into legal action and invite inquiry
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.'0 Of course,
access to information in employee personnel files should be carefully
restricted to those persons within the legitimate scope of employer's
qualified privilege.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The current widespread use of common law defamation by disgruntled employees is motivated by two distinct objectives. First, in
states which provide little or no employee protection from wrongful
discharge, defamation theories have been popularized as well recognized substitutes for improper employment terminations. When exercised in this manner, the tort of defamation has resulted in some
rather expansive judicial interpretations and considerable confusion
both within states and between court systems.
While employees are using the current uncertainties to manipulate employers through defamation claims, the use of defamation in
this manner will likely be curtailed as states become more progressive in offering express protection from wrongful discharges. For example, recent Minnesota legislation limited the use of compelled
self-publication in employee discharge cases.' 07 The statute compels
an employer, upon an employee's written request, to provide a truthful explanation for the employee's termination. The written explanation cannot become the basis for the employee defamation suit. 10 8
Although the law certainly does not abrogate Minnesota's employment-at-will doctrine, it does significantly increase the employer's
obligations to provide a legitimate reason for employee
terminations. 0 9
The second objective being pursued by employees through defa106. See Sparrow v. Piedmont Health Sys. Agency Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1107 (M.D.N.C.
1984) (employee successfully argued that her employer's refusal to provide a reference was

retaliation for her filing of a Title VII charge); G. PANARO, supra note 89, at 28.
107.

See supra note 18.

108. Id.
109.

See Tanick, supra note 15, at 17-18.
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mation lawsuits is the traditional interest in reputation which defamation laws were created to protect. Although defamation claims
motivated by such an interest may originate from an employee's discharge, the most fertile situation for future claims may be in employer's communications regarding continuing employees. Current
trends have heightened employees' (and lawyers') awareness of jobrelated defamation claims, and employers engaging in employee investigations, testings, and personnel evaluations will be compelled to
devise new self-protective measures to restrict these new sources of
defamation. A limited number of defamation cases have already
been decided involving employer allegations of employee thefts," 0
4
drug use,"' metal illness, 112 polygraph results, 13 alcohol abuse,"1
and sexual harassment." 5 The defamatory communication in these
situations may be the employer's express remarks, or may simply be
16
implied by virtue of the employer's conduct or gestures."
Aside from employer precautions, the most significant factor affecting the future success of employee defamation claims will be the
further judicial evolution of the common law qualified privilege. The
existing confusion over the applicability and scope of the employer's
privilege reflects the courts fundamental uncertainty over the parameters of First Amendment constraints and the precise purposes to be
served by the privilege. Until such confusion is reduced, the law of
defamation at the workplace will be characterized by copious use
and unpredictable application.

110. Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1, 722 P.2d 1106 (1986); Krochalis v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. 629 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Schneider v. Pay 'N Save Corp. 723
P.2d 619 (Alaska 1986).
111. See Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank N.A., 67 N.Y.2d 369, 494 N.E.2d 70, 502
N.Y.S.2d 965 (1986). Houston Belt and Terminal Ry. Co., v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 962).
112. Bratt v. International Business Mach. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d 126

(1984).
113.

Smith v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 614 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1984) aff'd, 800 F.2d

1139 (1986).
114.
115.
116.

Benassi v. Georgia Pac., 62 Or. App. 698, 662 P.2d 760 (1983).
Garziano v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987).
Gowin v. Hazen Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 311 N.W. 2d 554 (N.D. 1981) (Arbitrary

demotion of plaintiff imputed general disqualification for job); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94,
151 A.2d 476 (1956) (Store owner accosting plaintiff amounted to defamatory dramatic

pantomine.); See also Krochalis, 629 F. Supp. at 1360 (removal of plaintiff by security
guard).
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